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Introduction
The aim of this essay is to consider Sweden’s policy of neutrality during the reign of 
Gustav III (1772–1792) in relation to the development of Swedish trade. It focuses on 
how Sweden’s political economy adjusted itself to shifting circumstances during and 
after the American War of Independence and reconstructs the political character of 
Swedish commercial neutrality from an economic historical perspective. 
In the early 1780s, Sweden became one of Europe’s major shipping nations after 
participating in the first League of Armed Neutrality (of 1780–83). As a participant in 
this League, Sweden acted as a small neutral actor, a third-rank power comparable 
with Denmark or the United Provinces. Yet, this side of Swedish foreign politics, 
which was directed by Johan Liljencrantz’s careful manoeuvring, was subservient 
to Gustav III’s territorial aim of restoring Sweden as a great power.1 The contrast in 
character between these two directions of foreign policy affected Swedish neutrality 
during the two decades of Gustav III’s reign.
Sweden’s participation in the League of Armed Neutrality is a case in point. 
Whereas the League entailed cooperation between Russia and her northern 
neighbours, Sweden and Denmark, in realising complementary political aims, 
Gustav III always saw this set-up as coincidental and applicable to wartime only. 
Gustav’s longer-term diplomatic aim remained to split Denmark and Russia in order 
1 The main study of Liljencrantz’s political economy remains Åke W. Essén, Johan Liljencrantz 
som handelspolitiker. Studier i Sveriges yttre handelspolitik 1773–1786 (Lund, 1928). These tensions 
in Swedish foreign poitics were recognised also by Olof Jägerskiöld, Den svenska utrikespolitikens 
historia, vol. II:2, (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1957) pp. 252–85.
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to be able to successfully wage war on both neighbouring states. The acquisition 
of Norway, then a part of the Danish kingdom, was his first target. The second was 
Russia. Gustav aimed to strengthen Sweden’s position vis-à-vis her more powerful 
neighbour, which eventually led to the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790.
Understanding Sweden’s situation during the American War of Independence 
is important because Sweden played a significant role as trader and carrier, a fact 
that has been omitted from historical research. Scholars have paid more attention 
to Russia, Denmark or even Prussia and Austria than to Sweden. The perspective 
in the classical study by Isabel de Madariaga on James Harris’s diplomatic mission 
is predominantly British and the protagonists are diplomats of greater powers. By 
comparison little attention is paid to Sweden, and Gustav III is described as “young 
and vain”, as not been taken seriously by Catherine II and representatives of other 
states.2
This limited interest in Sweden’s place in diplomatic history may simply reflect 
Sweden’s declining military and political power in eighteenth-century Europe. 
Nonetheless, the lack of interest among Swedish historians is conspicuous in the 
light of the prominent position, since the twentieth century, of neutrality as part of 
the Swedish identity. With few exceptions Sweden’s neutrality has been studied 
as a modern phenomenon.3 Yet, the history of Sweden’s exploitation of neutrality 
goes back a lot further until at least the seventeenth-century Anglo-Dutch Wars.4 
As a policy it became consciously articulated in the course of the Anglo-French 
Wars of the eighteenth century, and especially during Gustav III’s reign. The 
person in charge of Sweden’s trade policy was Gustav’s Minister of Finance, Johan 
Liljencrantz. The aim of this chapter is to break new ground in understanding his 
ideas and politics in combination with and against the background of the specific 
economic characteristics of Sweden’s exploitation of neutrality compared with 
other neutrals.
The major beneficiaries of neutral shipping were Dutch and Danish merchants. 
Due to their status as neutrals, they expanded their shares in shipping in the course 
of eighteenth-century Anglo-French wars, especially in the Atlantic trades, the most 
2 Isabel De Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780. Sir James Harris’s 
Mission to St. Petersburg during the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) 
p. 189.
3 The best account of the history of Swedish neutrality is Mikael Af Malmborg, Neutrality and 
State-Building in Sweden (Chippenham: Palgrave, 2001). For modern perspectives see Ulla Nordlöf-
Lagerkranz ed., Svensk neutralitet, Europa och EG (Göteborg: MH Publ., 1990); Bo Hugemark 
ed., Neutralitet och försvar. Perspektiv på svensk säkerhetspolitik 1809–1985 (Stockholm: 
Militärhistoriska förl., 1986); Alf W. Johansson, ”Neutralitet och modernitet: andra världskriget 
och Sveriges nationella identitet”, Den nazistiska utmaningen. Aspekter på andra världskriget 
(Stockholm:Rabén Prisma, 2000), pp. 258–77. 
4 Werner Pursche, “Stockholms handelssjöfart och de engelska kaperierna 1652—16542, Studier 
och handlingar rörande Stockholms historia, vol. 3, (Stockholm: Stockholms stadsarkiv, 1966); 
Birger Fahlborg, ”Ett blad ur det svenska handelsflottans historia (1660–1675)”, Historisk tidskrift 43 
(1923); Steve Murdoch, Andrew Little and A.D.M. Forte, ”Scottish Privateering, Swedish Neutrality 
and Prize Law in the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672–1674”, Forum navale 59 (2003), pp. 37–65.
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lucrative part of neutral trade.5 Sweden, which until 1784 lacked a colonial basis, 
did not engage in this trade. The composition of its foreign commerce included 
little transit trade. Sweden’s major exports were in fact Baltic products. Accordingly, 
Swedish shipping consisted of voluminous and low-price exports, such as iron, 
sawn goods, naval stores, and large imports of necessities such as grain and salt. 
Due to this trade composition transport costs were relatively high. 
In response to this situation, carrying business for foreigners, so-called tramp 
shipping, was seen as a way of increasing profitability. Rising numbers of Swedish 
ships freighted in the Mediterranean indicate that this approach was successful. 
Shipping for foreigners was especially lucrative during wartime when freight rates 
rapidly increased. Both Denmark and Sweden were consistent neutrals, engaged 
in intensive trade with southern Europe and thus consolidated their status as 
carriers. In this respect, both Denmark and Sweden profited from neutrality, unlike 
neutral Russia, whose merchant fleet was insignificant and whose export trade 
was carried on mainly by British and Dutch bottoms. 
Still, the manner in which the Swedes exploited neutrality had little to do with the 
major controversies of the time surrounding neutrality and the development of legal 
definitions of neutrality and neutrals’ rights that are discussed in other chapters in 
this volume. Neutrality did not play the same role in the foreign politics of Sweden 
as of Denmark or the United Provinces, its neutral trade did not fall in the same 
legal categories, and Sweden, by comparison, was perceived by belligerents as a 
different kind of neutral state.
The neutral rights revolution during the Seven Years’ War provides a good 
example of how the understanding of neutral rights in the course of the eighteenth 
century reflected the priorities of the great powers’ Britain and France in their 
relation to the main neutral carrier, the United Provinces.6 The British doctrines 
that qualitatively changed the concept of neutral trade, the Rule of the War of 1756 
and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, related to the Dutch rights of carrying the 
French colonial produce from the West Indies. The British authorities argued that 
the Dutch carrying business during wartime was illegal because the French colonial 
trade was closed for the Dutch during peacetime and that the same principle had 
to be continued as a rule in wartime. These doctrines were equally significant 
5 Generally on neutral trade and war see H.S.K. Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas. Anglo-
Scandinavian economic relations in the mid-eighteenth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973). On Denmark’s neutrality and trade: Ole Feldbæk, Dansk neutralitetspolitik under 
krigen 1778–1783. Studier i regeringens prioritering af politiske og oekonomiske interesser 
(Copenhagen: Akademisk forlag, 1971), Ole Feldbæk, “Eighteenth-Century Danish Neutrality: Its 
Diplomacy, Economics and Law”, Scandinavian Journal of History (1983), pp. 3–21, Ole Feldbæk, 
India Trade under the Danish Flag 1772–1808 (Lund, 1969), Ole Feldbæk, Denmark and the Armed 
Neutrality 1800–1801. Small Power Policy in a World War (Copenhagen: Akademisk forlag, 1980); 
Dan H. Andersen and Hans-Joachim Voth, “The Grapes of War: Neutrality and Mediterranean 
Shipping under Danish Flag, 1747–1807”, Scandinavian Economic History Review 48 (2000), 
pp. 5–27. On Dutch neutral trade Georg Maria Welling, The Prize of Neutrality. Trade Relations 
between Amsterdam and North America 1771–1817. A Study in Computational History (Amsterdam 
: Historisch Seminarium van de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1998).
6 See the chapter by Tara Helfman in this volume.
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for Danish neutral shipping in the West Indies, which copied the Dutch strategy. 
Danish shipping from the West Indies was large already during the Seven Years’ 
War and expanded considerably during the American War of Independence, at the 
expense of the Dutch. As regards Danish shipping rights, the British referred to the 
Anglo-Danish bilateral treaty of 1670, which defined soldiers, weapons, cannons, 
mortars, ships and more vaguely “military necessities” as contraband.7 Military 
necessities could include provisions—the most important Danish export. Because 
the definition of contraband was vague, disputes between prize courts, privateers, 
ship owners and diplomats were current. The British authorities frequently behaved 
benevolently in their treatment of the Danes, because of shared political interests. 
During the Anglo-French Wars, Denmark stayed neutral yet followed mainly pro-
British and pro-Russian interests. 
However, the same British doctrines did not respond to the profile of Swedish 
trade. The Swedish West Indies trade was nonexistent. Instead, the crucial issue 
for Swedish wartime trade was the British treatment of iron and naval stores, which 
depended on the interpretation of the dated Anglo-Swedish trade treaty of 1661 
that failed to include a clear definition of contraband.8 As a consequence, the 
British, unhampered by political constraints – as in the case of Denmark – happily 
identified naval stores on board of Swedish ships as contraband of war. Even 
though the Swedes did not trade for the enemy – as the Dutch or the Danes did – 
but with the enemy, their ships sailing in the North Sea were taken to British ports 
and cargoes were condemned as good prize. Thus, the Swedes became, one 
might say, innocent victims of the crackdown on abusive neutral trade by British 
maritime law. How did this legal-political situation intersect with Swedish political 
economy under Gustav III?
Swedish foreign policy and commercial 
priorities 1772–1780
The period between the end of the Great Northern War 1721 and Gustav III’s 
coup d’état in 1772 (i.e. the Age of Liberty) was characterised by weak royal power 
and outdrawn political struggles between different political groups of the Swedish 
estates (riksdag). A typical feature of the period was the involvement of foreign 
powers, especially of Russia and France, in domestic politics. After 1772 Gustav 
imposed an ideal of independence onto Swedish politics, which its neighbours, 
Russia and Denmark, recognised as a threat. In August 1773, a Russian-Danish 
alliance treaty was signed that aimed at the restoration of the pre-Gustavian political 
regime. Gustav III’s diplomacy during the 1770s and 1780s constantly opposed this 
alliance by seeking foreign support mainly from France but also from the Ottoman 
7 Feldbæk, “Eighteenth-Century Danish Neutrality”, p. 5.
8 Carl August Zachrisson, Sveriges underhandlingar om beväpnad neutralitet åren 1778–80 
(Uppsala: Leffler, 1863), pp. 3–5.
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Empire.9 Gustav III meanwhile made efforts to exploit his kinship with Catherine the 
Great and met the Empress in St Petersburg, in 1777, only to find that she had no 
intention to endanger Russia’s relationship with Denmark and in private, dismissed 
Gustav III as unreliable and naïve.10 
A search for independence was also a defining characteristic of Swedish 
economic reforms. During the first years of Gustav’s reign, Sweden was struck 
by bad harvests and food shortages, and currency devaluation. The reform 
programme directed by Johan Liljencrantz between 1773 and 1786 took place 
against this background and focused on the promotion of trade and shipping as 
well as the improvement of agriculture. These choices represented a break with 
the Age of Liberty economic policy of supporting domestic industries and crafts.11 
Liljencrantz first important measure was the currency reform of 1777, which 
terminated the early seventeenth-century bimetallic (copper and silver) system.12 
To help price levels restabilise after the turbulent late 1760s and early 1770s 
Liljencrantz saw income from transit trade and freights, which were supported by 
Sweden’s neutrality, as the key to undoing a negative balance of trade. As he 
stated years later, the expansion of trade and shipping during the American War of 
Independence caused an inflow of payments into Sweden that improved exchange 
rates and thereby made the successful currency reform possible.13
Liljencrantz believed that Sweden’s active trade policy, of transit trade in 
particular, should be promoted by the establishment of free ports. The model 
Liljencrantz had in mind was Livorno, the leading free port in Italy and one of the 
major commercial centres of the Mediterranean, which Liljencrantz visited and 
studied in the early years of his career.14 
9 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, pp. 53–58, Feldbæk, Dansk neutralitetspolitik under krigen 1778–
1783, p. 15.
10 On the personal relationship between Catherine the Great and Gustav III see Magnus Olausson, 
Katarina den stora och Gustav III. En månad i S.t Petersburg (Stockholm: Forum, 1998), and 
correspondence Katarina II och Gustaf III. En återfunnen brevväxling. Gunnar von Proschwitz ed. 
(Stockholm: Norstedt, 1998).
11 Lars Magnusson, Äran, korruptionen och den borgerliga ordningen, (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2001). 
See also especially the role of Anders Chydenius. On Chydenius see Pentti Virrankoski, Anders 
Chydenius: demokratisk politiker i upplysningens tid. (Stockholm: Timbro, 1995).
12 Currency reform in Sweden was an outcome of outdrawn discussions on exchange rates in 
the 1760s For the historical background see Leos Müller, “Economic Policy in Eighteenth-Century 
Sweden and Early Modern Entrepreneurial Behaviour. A Case of the Exchange Office”, Entrepreneurs 
and institutions in Europe and Asia 1500–2000. Ferry De Goey, Jan Willem Veluwenkamp eds. 
(Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), pp. 127–47. For the pamphlet debate in the 1760s see The Swedish 
bullionist controversy: P.N. Christiernin’s Lectures on the high price of foreign exchange in Sweden 
(1761), Robert V. Eagly ed. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1971).
13 “Den låga växel-coursen gaf anledning dertil, att ganska mycket omyntat silfver […] inkom på 
Kongl. Myntet, hvilket igenom förbettrade anstalter under den mig speciellt anbefalte tilsyn var 
satt i det tilstånd, att kunna utmynta tvåhundrade tusende Riksdaler Specie hvarje månad”, Johan 
Liljencrantz, Anteckningar och memorial af Grefve Johan Liljencrantz. Historiska handlingar, vol. 
VIII, (Stockholm: Samf, 1878), p. 27.
14 Tal, om Sveriges utrikes handel i allmänhet, och den levantiska i synnerhet, hållet för Kongl. 
vetenskaps academien, vid præsidii nedläggande, den 31. januarii 1770, af Johan Westerman 
[Johan Liljencrantz]. På Kongl. Vetenskaps academiens befallning (Stockholm, 1770).
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In Sweden two places were considered: Marstrand near Gothenburg on the west 
coast, and the harbour of Slite on Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Both ports were ideally 
situated to reduce the Dutch transit trade in the Baltic and North Seas. Marstrand 
was intended as a free port for imports into the Baltic area and was also supposed to 
compete with Copenhagen and St. Petersburg as redistribution centres in northern 
Europe. Liljencrantz envisaged Slite to become the centre for channelling Russian 
trade via Gotland. Russia was a large exporter of naval stores, iron and wheat, 
but had no merchant fleet, so that her trade was carried on British and Dutch 
bottoms. Liljencrantz planned to divert this lucrative carrying business to Slite. 
This plan was not new; Slite had been discussed as a potential staple port at least 
since the mid-seventeenth century. Unfortunately, this required Russian collaboration, 
which Gustav III tried to enlist as part of a new commercial treaty with Russia. Gustav 
III’s failed mission to St. Petersburg in 1777 abruptly drew a close to the project.
The Marstrand project was more successful. In 1775 the town was declared a 
free port, and excluded from Sweden’s fiscal legislation.15 During wartime Marstrand 
attracted French and American privateers, its population grew and business 
boomed. Between 1776 and 1783 the Marstrand trade expanded significantly, 
notably its American trade. In 1782, the highpoint of the period, half of exports from 
Marstrand went to North America, which explains Swedish eagerness to conclude 
a commercial treaty with the American Republic.16
Swedish trade activities at Marstrand, however, irritated the Brits. In 1779, they 
alleged that French and American business in Marstrand was illegal and violated 
the 1661 Anglo-Swedish treaty already mentioned above.17 The Swedish authorities 
replied that in the case of Marstrand the treaty was not relevant because Marstrand 
was excluded from the Swedish territorial jurisdiction. 
The failure of the Baltic free port plans (Slite) and the temporary success of 
Marstrand coincided with a re-orientation of Swedish commercial ambitions towards 
the Atlantic. Here too Liljencrantz left a strong legacy by actively participating in 
the preparations for an American-Swedish trade treaty in 1783, engaging in the 
establishment of the Swedish West India Company and through setting up the free 
port of Gustavia – the port city of the island of St Barthélemy, Sweden’s West Indian 
colony acquired from France in 1784, immediately after American independence.18
Whereas the profile of Swedish neutral trade differed entirely from the Danish 
and Dutch, resemblances with Russia were stronger. Both countries principally 
exported naval stores and iron to Britain and West Europe. This was the reason why 
the Swedes, in the winter of 1778–1779, approached Catherine II with a suggestion 
15 Modée, R. G. ed., Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7 dec. 1718 utkomne publique handlingar etc. 
(Stockholm, 1742–1803), vol. 13, p. 461.
16 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 177.
17 J. F. Chance ed., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. V – Sweden, 1727–1789 
(London: Camden Society, 1928), pp. 232–33. The Swedish authorities argued that Marstrand was 
a free port, and was excluded from the bilateral Anglo-Swedish treaty.
18 A discussion of St. Barthélemy follows below. 
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of joint trade protection. The Swedish-Russian negotiations, however, also unveiled 
the differences between Russia’s and Sweden’s commercial interests – not to 
mention the discrepancies in their foreign policy aims. Since Russia had no merchant 
fleet of its own, and risks were born by foreign carriers, it had limited interest in 
the protection of neutral shipping. Russia instead proposed coastal protection of 
shipping, which, in Russia’s case, meant between Archangel and the North Cape. 
Such protection was useful for British ships carrying cargoes from Archangel, but 
useless for Swedish long-distance shipping and offered no solution of her problems 
with the British Navy and privateers. Thus the winter negotiations between von 
Nolcken, the Swedish envoy in St. Petersburg, and the Russian Minister Count 
Panin failed because of British pressure on Russia and disagreements between 
Panin and his rival Potemkin on Russian foreign policy.19
The League of Armed Neutrality and Sweden
The period between the outbreak of the American War of Independence in Europe 
in 1778 and the declaration of the League of Armed Neutrality in February 1780 
was marked by fervent diplomatic efforts in St. Petersburg, Copenhagen and 
London. Russia, Denmark and Britain held common trade and military interests 
which concerted to exclude Sweden from Balance of Power arrangements.20
The interlocking of Russian and British interests and commercial inter-
dependencies went back a long time. Russia’s main areas of interest were Central 
and South-Eastern Europe, where its great enemy was the Ottoman Empire. Britain 
had no interest in these areas. On the other hand, Russia did not immerse in the 
Anglo-French colonial contest in North America and the West Indies.21 Russia was 
Britain’s leading supplier of iron and naval stores. The strategic importance of these 
two commodities and restricted possibilities to acquire them elsewhere furnished 
her with good reasons to cherish her relations with Russia. Vice versa Russia was 
keen to keep Britain as its major trade partner and export carrier. 
The main factor in Danish foreign policy was the 1773 Eternal Alliance Treaty 
with Russia that guaranteed its territorial integrity.22 Although Denmark itself had 
no Russian economic interest, its combined merchant fleet (including ships from 
Denmark, Norway and the Duchies Schleswig and Holstein) was among Europe’s 
largest and Russian political support to keep out potential neutral competitors, such 
as Sweden, was very welcome.
19 Zachrisson, Sveriges underhandlingar, p. 15.
20 Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 83–95.
21 This lack of Russian interest in the Atlantic issues is clearly visible in the failure of Francis 
Dana’s diplomatic mission in St Petersburg. Francis Dana was the first American envoy in Russia. 
On Dana’s mission to St Petersburg see David M. Griffiths, “American Commercial Diplomacy in 
Russia, 1780 to 1783”. The William and Mary Quarterly, 27 (1970), pp. 379–410.
22 Feldbæk, Dansk neutralitetspolitik under krigen 1778–1783, pp. 14–15.
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The relative stability of these arrangements that formed part of a wider web of 
the European Balance of Power was upset – for what remain unclear reasons – in 
February 1780, when the Russian Empress Catherine II issued her proclamation 
of Armed Neutrality. The immediate reason given at the time of the proclamation 
was the seizure of some Russian ships by Spanish privateers in Gibraltar. Thus, 
amidst great confusion across Europe, it could initially be understood as directed 
against the Bourbon powers France and Spain. Soon it became clear, however, 
that its principal logic interfered with the British treatment of the law of neutrality.23 
Precisely because the British doctrine was encapsulated by the Balance of Power, 
Catherine’s declaration caused great uncertainty, not in the least in Northern Europe.
None of the Nordic neutrals welcomed a general concept of free trade during the 
war because they competed for the same customers. This was especially apparent 
in the case of Denmark which clearly would prefer bilateral solutions with Russia 
and Britain. As a matter of fact, both the courts in Copenhagen and Stockholm had 
proposed to Russia joint defence of shipping and trade since the outbreak of the 
War of the American Independence. A general concept of neutral trade and mutual 
protection of neutrals, such as the League of Armed Neutrality, reduced Denmark’s 
exclusive situation.
Thus it opted for a strategy that eventually would help destroy the League. On 
the one hand it negotiated with Russia about participating in the League of Armed 
Neutrality. On the other hand it secretly discussed with the Brits an amendment of 
the old Anglo-Danish treaty of 1670. On 4 July 1780, a few days before the Danish 
accession to the League of Armed Neutrality, Count Andreas Peter Bernstorff, 
the leading figure in Danish foreign politics, signed the latter treaty amendment 
that allowed Danish ships to carry provisions to the West Indies that traditionally 
hade been treated as contraband.24 When Bernstorff’s secret hedging activities 
were found out, Denmark opted for a nominally anti-British course, yet it clearly 
remained attached to its previous anti-Swedish political preferences.
Unsurprisingly, Sweden’s decision to join the League was much easier. The 
Swedes, French allies, received the least beneficial treatment of all neutral carriers 
by the British. From the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in summer 1778 to 
March 1779 the British seized thirty-two Swedish vessels, many of them loaded 
with cargoes of tar and pitch for French ports.25 Since the Swedes had attempted 
themselves, without success, in 1778–9 to enlist Russian support to protect their 
trade, they now could not comprehend what seemed liked a dramatic sea change 
23 Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality, p. 180.
24 Knud J.V. Jespesen and Ole Feldbæk, Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie 2, Revanche og neutralitet 
1648–1814 (Copenhagen: Danmarks Nationalleksikon, 2002), p. 359.
25 Arnold Barton. “Sweden and the War of American Independence”, The William and Mary 
Quarterly 23 (1966), p. 424. See also notary letters, dated 19 September 1778 and 13 October 1778, 
Diplomatica, Anglica, vol. 442, Swedish National Archives, Stockholm.
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on Catherine’s part. Once more details were known in September 1780 Sweden 
acceded to the League.26
Despite the fact that both Denmark and Sweden, as well as other European 
states (Prussia, Austria, Portugal and Naples) joined the League, the set-up was 
riddled with colliding motives and interests. There was a clear discrepancy between 
the aims of Denmark and Sweden and the general perception of Catherine’s 
proclamation as a free trade scheme as well as a commercial peace plan.27 
Denmark and Sweden had no special interest in overall principles of free trade and 
neutrality that reduced their specific national advantages.
Owing to these tensions the League could never have fully overhauled the 
existing interstate system, if that really was its aim.28 But was Catherine’s scheme 
completely unsuccessful? Isabel De Madariaga, the leading authority, judged that 
the League of Armed Neutrality was part of Catherine the Great’s long-term policy 
of the development of Russian trade in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.29 
Yet, this does not mean – as may be useful to emphasise – either that Catherine 
cynically used the League simply to further Russia’s own interest, or that its impact on 
international trade was non-existent – as figures concerning the Swedish case show.
Sweden’s neutral trade and shipping 
between 1780 and 1783
The issue of the profitability of neutral trade in wartime can be approached 
from different historical sub-disciplinary perspectives. Legal history reflects the 
normative ways leading jurists and politicians saw neutrality in relation to the good 
of humankind. Diplomatic history provides detailed information on cases of seized 
vessels, admiralty court negotiations, complaints by ship owners, captains and 
cargo owners about depredations by naval forces and privateers, which leaves 
the impression that neutral shipping was an extremely risky and not very attractive 
business.30 
26 Zachrisson, Sveriges underhandlingar, pp. 30–31.
27 Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality, p. 193. Catherine is described as “Arbitre, 
équitable et puissante Finis l’esclavage des mers”. On perceptions by Benjamin Franklin and John 
Adams see Griffiths, “American Commercial Diplomacy in Russia”, pp. 382–83. 
28 Russia herself also did not retain the character of the cosmopolitan agent that the League 
intended to shape. Already during the winter 1780–1781 Catherine’s attention was drawn again 
to Russia’s continental policy, to the treaty with Austria and the danger of a new war with the 
Ottoman Empire. In such situation the common interests of Britain and Russia became once again 
more important than the principal defence of neutral trade and shipping. See Griffiths, “American 
Commercial Diplomacy in Russia”, p. 400; and John P. LeDonne, The Grand Strategy of the Russian 
Empire, 1650–1831 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 116–19.
29 Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 173–80.
30 See for example, G.A. Nolcken’s reports in Handlingar ang. uppbringningar, 1, 1764–1793, 
Diplomatica, Anglica, vol. 442. Swedish National Archives, Stockholm, and Skrivelser från konsuler, 
Cadiz 1719–1802, E VI a:67, Kommerskollegium Huvudarkivet, Swedish National Archives, 
Stockholm.
Müller 
152
In contrast, economic history based on available data on shipping and trade 
unveils a rapid expansion of the economic activities of neutrals and testifies to the 
profitability of neutral business. Yet, so far neutral shipping during the American 
War of Independence has been studied mainly through Danish and Dutch sources 
and thus focused on the West Indies. The following complements these studies 
by considering the Swedish case, in particular: (1) the overall expansion of the 
Swedish merchant fleet and the total volume of shipping, (2) tramp shipping in 
southern Europe, and (3) trade under Swedish flag in Asia.
The data on annual numbers of registered ships and their tonnages reflects an 
overall expansion of Swedish merchant tonnage during wartime. Between 1774 
and 1783 the number of vessels under Swedish flag increased from 664 to 976, a 
remarkable increase by 47 per cent.31 The Swedish merchant fleet expanded since 
the end of the Great Northern War, yet the speed of the expansion in the 1770s 
and the early 1780s was unusual. The growth of Sweden’s total tonnage during 
the war turned the kingdom into one of Europe’s biggest carriers by the mid-1780s. 
According to a French estimate from 1786–87, Sweden had the fifth merchant 
marine in Europe, bigger than Spain, Portugal, and The Two Sicilies. It is worth 
noting that after the war, the combined merchant tonnage of the two Scandinavian 
neutrals exceeded by far the tonnage of the United Provinces and was not much 
smaller than that of France. This sudden increase must be ascribed to the political 
factor of Scandinavian neutrality during the American War of Independence.32
Table 1. Major European merchant marines 1786–87.
Country Number or vessels Tonnage (tons)
Britain – 881963
France 5268 729340
The United Provinces 1871 397709
Denmark-Norway 3601 386020
Sweden 1224 169279
Spain 1202 149460
The Two Sicilies 1047 132220
Hanseatic towns 467 101347
Portugal 300 84843
Other merchant marines 339848
Total 3372029
Source: Ruggiero Romano, “Per una valutazione della flotta mercantile europea alla fine del secolo 
XVIII”, Studi in onore Amintore Fanfani, vol. v, Evi moderno e contemporaneo. (Milan, 1962), p. 578.
31 Leos Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce. The Swedish Consular Service and Long-
Distance Shipping, 1720–1815. (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 2004), p. 142. These figures 
do not include Swedish-flagged tonnage from Swedish Pomerania. 
32 Ruggiero Romano, “Per una valutazione della flotta mercantile europea alla fine del secolo 
XVIII”, Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, vol 5, Evi moderno e contemporaneo (Milano, Hoepli 
1962), p. 578. The data are based on information collected by French consuls in European countries.
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An alternative way of measuring the impact of political neutrality on Swedish 
shipping activities is by looking into the data on passages through the Sound. 
As mentioned above, the Baltic area was the major supplier of naval stores to 
European sea powers and of iron and sawn goods, in particular to Britain. Annual 
numbers of voyages of Swedish-registered ships through the Sound increased 
from 964 in 1775 to 1,545 in 1780, the year of the League’s declaration, an increase 
by 60 per cent. Between 1780 and 1783 the number of Swedish voyages through 
the Sound increased to 2,131, an increase by another 40 per cent.33 By the end of 
the American War of Independence the combined share of Scandinavian neutral 
shipping through the Sound was almost one half. Consequently, by 1783 the two 
neutrals replaced the Dutch and significantly reduced the British carrying trade in 
the Baltic.34 The Dutch returned after 1784 but in much lower numbers than before 
the Anglo-Dutch War.35 The wartime expansion occurred in spite of the privateering 
activities of the belligerents in the North Sea.36 The growth in the total neutral traffic 
through the Sound reflected naturally the increase in demand for Baltic products as 
well as an increase in demand for neutral shipping capacity. During the American 
War of Independence the total number of vessels under all flags passing the Sound 
increased. The intensity of traffic through the Sound indicates there was a direct 
impact of political neutrality on Swedish trade and shipping. However, the Sound 
data do not provide any information about Swedish long-distance trade: Sweden 
took part in neutral shipping for belligerents in Europe and in Asia, activities that by 
their legal nature were much closer to the neutral trade of Denmark and the United 
Provinces in the Atlantic. 
As mentioned above, Swedish tramp shipping in southern Europe was a 
complement to the disadvantageous export-import composition of Sweden’s trade. 
To balance this disadvantage the Swedes matched commodity exchange with 
shipping services. Shipping services became extremely lucrative during wartime 
when freight rates rapidly grew and the American War of Independence provided 
the Swedes with such profitable conditions. 
The best indicator of the development is the data on so-called Algerian 
passports. Algerian passports were identity documents issued for all Swedish 
ships sailing beyond Cape Finisterre in northern Spain. The passports were result 
of the peace treaties with Algiers and the other North-African states. According to 
these treaties, all Swedish vessels sailing in southern Europe had to prove their 
33 Nina Ellinger Bang and Knud Korst, Tabeller over skibsfart och varetransport gennem Øresund 
1661–1783. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1930–1953).
34 David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires. England and the Netherlands in the Age of 
Mercantilism, 1650–1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 281 and 284.
35 Hans Chr. Johansen, Shipping and Trade between the Baltic Area and Western Europe 1784–
95 (Odense: Odense University Press, 1983), p. 18, Table 2.1.
36 In addition, it should be noted that the data about Swedish traffic in the Sound excludes the 
shipping from Sweden’s west coast.
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nationality by Algerian passports.37 Before the war in Europe, between 1771 and 
1777, the number of vessels supplied with Algerian passports was stagnant, about 
250 passports per annum. In 1780 the annual number of voyages jumped to 320 
and in 1782, the highpoint of shipping under the League of Armed Neutrality, the 
number of passports was 441, an increase at almost 80 per cent, compared to the 
early 1770s. 
Table 2. The numbers of Algerian passports issued for Swedish-registered vessels, 1771–85.
Year Algerian passports Index Algerian passports 
(1771 equal 1.00)
1771 246 1,00
1772 270 1,10
1773 267 1,09
1774 278 1,13
1775 222 0,90
1776 236 0,96
1777 253 1,03
1778 287 1,17
1779 282 1,15
1780 320 1,30
1781 373 1,52
1782 441 1,79
1783 339 1,38
1784 370 1,50
1785 389 1,58
Source: Leos Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce. The Swedish Consular Service and Long-
Distance Shipping, 1720–1815. (Uppsala, 2004), p. 143, table 5.5 and p. 234 Appendix C.
The picture of the expanding tramp shipping in southern Europe is confirmed in 
the records of arrivals of ships in major Mediterranean ports: Marseilles, Livorno, 
Genoa, Cadiz and Lisbon. A comparison between the number of Swedish-
registered ships and the registers of Algerian passports indicates that one third 
of all Swedish vessels in foreign trade actually were employed in tramp shipping 
in southern Europe. Considering a large average tonnage per ship and lengthy 
sailing seasons in southern Europe the total shipping output was larger than a third. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive study of the profitability of the Swedish 
shipping during the years of the American War of Independence but comparable 
studies of individual shipping firms from Denmark and Finland indicate that wartime 
profitability was extremely high.38 
37 Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, pp. 58–60.
38 Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 163; Ole Ventegodt, Redere, rejser og regnskaber. 
Et par flensborgske partrederiregnskaber 1783–1812 (Flensborg: Dansk Centralbibliotek for 
Sydslesvig, 1989); Jari Ojala, “Productivity and Technological Change in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-
Century Sea Transport: A Case Study of Sailing ship Efficiency in Kokkola, Finland 1721–1913”, 
International Journal of Maritime History 9 (1997), pp. 93–123.
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Sweden also participated, next to the Dutch and the Danes – the main traders 
between North America, the West Indies and Europe – in the European Asia trade. 
Here, the Danes, in particular, exploited their neutral status in India, and increased 
their private as well as company trade.39 But the Swedes followed not far behind.
Sweden’ window in the trade with colonial Asia was Canton, the only port in 
China in which European trade was permitted and the only major port in Asia 
open to all European companies, including the Swedish East India Company. 
Trade in Canton was divided between the dominant English East India Company40 
and four other fairly equal companies: the Dutch, French, Danish and Swedish.41 
The outbreak of Anglo-French war in 1778 eliminated the French and the outbreak 
of the Anglo-Dutch war, in 1780, left the Danes and Swedes as the only neutral 
carriers. Soon the number of Swedish vessels sailing to Canton increased and 
annual purchases of tea, the most important Chinese commodity, rose from 900 
tons in the 1760s to almost 1,560 tons in the war year 1778–1784.42 In 1783–84 the 
Swedish company, still feeling the wartime boom, imported 4.2 million pounds of 
tea.43 Almost all tea imported by the Swedish East India Company was auctioned 
at Gothenburg, and re-distributed to consumers in the United Provinces, France, 
the Austrian Netherlands, and – illegally – to Britain.
The neutral companies of Denmark and Sweden profited heavily from the 
smuggling of teas they imported to Britain, where the EIC held a legal monopoly 
over the tea trade. The British authorities were well aware of its scale. Glutting of 
the British market with smuggled teas from Scandinavia during the American War of 
Independence caused losses of customs duties and sales problems for the English 
EIC. In response, directly after the war, in 1784, the British government passed the 
so-called Commutation Act, which reduced the level of duties on legally imported 
teas, which made legal teas much cheaper. Simultaneously, the EIC increased its 
tea imports. These measures together ruined the illegal market for teas and broke 
the Swedish and Danish trades in Canton. The Scandinavian companies continued 
to sail to China after 1784 but their profitability suffered and their shares in the 
Canton trade sharply declined. Unlike the longer-term effects of political neutrality 
39 Feldbæk, India Trade.
40 Its value exceeded the value of all British imports from India, and the tea was after sugar the 
second most valuable product in Britain’s colonial trade, Jacob M. Price, “The Imperial Economy, 
1700–1776”, The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Eighteenth Century. P.J. Marshall ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), vol. 2, p. 100.
41 Louis Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident. Le Commerce at Canton au XVIIIe siècle 1719–1833 
(Paris, 1964), vol. 1–2, p. 539; Paul A. Van Dyke, “Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–
1845”, (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, PhD dissertation, 2002), Appendices AA, 
and AB.
42 See above in Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, p. 539.
43 By comparison, in the same year the British imported 5.9 million pounds and the European 
continental tea imports (so excluding the EIC) were 11.4 million pounds, Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H 
Mui, “Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784”, American Historical Review 74 (1968), p. 49.
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on European shipping, the Swedish Asian trade ceased to benefit from neutrality 
almost immediately when the war was ended. 
The period of 1780–1783 also saw the beginning of non-company Swedish 
shipping to the Indian Ocean. Data of arrivals of Swedish flagged ships in the 
French colonies of Mauritius and Reunion equally show this trade their neutral 
status thrived during wartime but quickly disappeared.44 
Interestingly, cases of Swedish ships hired for freight from Lorient to the French 
West Indies, and diplomatic sources suggest the French attempted to enlist the 
Swedes in their trade with the French West Indies. After the outbreak of the Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War and the British occupation of St. Eustatius the French needed a 
replacement neutral carrier and turned to the Swedes.45 Both in the Atlantic and 
the Indian Oceans Swedish tramp shipping appeared in 1781 as a result of the 
outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Yet, the available evidence indicates fairly 
limited and unsustainable activities. Without its own colonies, Swedish shipping in 
the Atlantic or Indian Oceans could not settle. Johan Liljencrantz was well aware of 
this limitation. Swedish neutral shipping was profitable in wartime:
During the American War with England, in which both France and United Provinces 
were engaged, the Swedish flag was very much searched for. Profitable freight rates 
gave the state [Sweden] and the ship owners large profits. The Swedish East India 
Company made in a short time quite large money, because English and Dutch trade 
with China, due to the war, was limited, which also entailed a lower purchase price in 
Canton, but notable increase in tea price in both London and Amsterdam, in benefit for 
them who sold tea to these places.46
But it was also short lived and the challenge was to attract it in such a way that trade 
remained in Swedish hands.47 This explains the engagement of Swedish politicians 
in Atlantic projects of Swedish trade launched directly after the American War of 
Independence. Sweden’s ambitious policy included plans for a colony in the West 
Indies, promotion of the trade with the young American Republic and even plans 
for Swedish slave trade from Africa. All these ambitions presupposed that Sweden 
44 Auguste Toussaint, La Route des Iles. Contribution a l’histoire maritime des Mascareignes 
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1967).
45 Ingegerd Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S.t Barthélemy och Västindiska kompaniet fram till 
1796. (Lund: Lindstedts universitetsbokhandel, 1951), pp. 10–18.
46 ”Under Americanske kriget med England, deruti både Frankrike och Holland vore invecklade, 
var svenska flaggan, såsom neutral, mycket eftersökt. Födelacktige frackter gåfvo Riket och 
enskylte skepsredare en ganska betydande förtjänst. Svenska Ost-Indiska Compagniet, som förut 
hade en föga lönande rörelse, vant på kort tid ganska ansenliga summor derigenom att Englands 
och Hollands handel på China för krigets skull måste inskränkas, hwilket i hast föranlänt et lindrigare 
inköpspris i Canton, men en ansenlig förhöjning i Thépriset både i England och Holland til förmån 
för den som hade thé att til berörde orter aflåta.” Liljencrantz, Anteckningar och memorial af Grefve 
Johan Liljencrantz, p. 27.
47 Another example concerns the free-port of Marstrand, which attracted substantial trade with the 
American colonies during the war, but declined rapidly after 1783; Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 213.
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would stay neutral in future Anglo-French conflicts and to a large extent copy the 
strategy of the Danes and the Dutch.
Swedish neutrality and Atlantic trade 1783–1800 
In the summer of 1783 Gustav III and Catherine the Great met again, this time on 
the Russo-Swedish border at Fredrikshamn, and once again Gustav III’s objective 
was to break the alliance between Denmark and Russia. The discussions with the 
Russians concerned moreover a new trade treaty, to improve the conditions for 
Swedish transit trade in Russian commodities. This strategy embodied a return to 
Liljencrantz’s plans from the 1770s. The meeting was again a failure, both regarding 
foreign political and commercial ambitions and was the final blow to Liljencrantz’s 
plans for Swedish transit trade in the Baltic.48 After suffering this defeat his focus 
shifted to the Atlantic. The most significant part of the plans was the acquisition of 
a Swedish colony in the West Indies that was supposed to function in the same way 
as the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, and perhaps produce its own sugar. During 
the war already, Swedish diplomats in Paris investigated the possibilities to obtain 
a French West Indian island, for example Tobago. 
Yet, following the war relations between France and Sweden became tense 
at the time of Gustav’s desperate final attempt to find a new ally in Russia at the 
meeting in Fredrikshamn. Once, after the Frederikshamn failure, Sweden was 
forced to accept France as a stable political ally the French attitude changed, and 
during the autumn 1783 negotiations were resumed.
In July 1784 Sweden acquired from France the tiny island of St. Barthélemy, in 
exchange for free staple rights for the French in Gothenburg. St. Barthélemy was 
one of the smallest and economically least important islands in the French West 
Indies. It had no commercial production of sugar of other tropical goods, small 
population or even sufficient sources of water. It only had a good harbor, which 
under Swedish rule was renamed Gustavia. The French, on their part, made little 
use of their staple rights in Gothenburg as the numbers of French ships entering 
Sweden remained insignificant.49
Johan Liljencranz himself was no advocate of the Swedish West Indian colonial 
enterprise. He preferred the development of the Baltic and southern-European 
trades. Yet, he still influenced the trade policy of St. Barthélemy, not least by 
writing a fairly sceptical report on the possibilities of St. Barthélemy’s economic 
development and the effective political restrictions, the result of other states’ power, 
to building up a colonial empire. The only way to exploit the island was to encourage 
the transit trade between other West Indian colonies and North America in the 
same way as the Dutch and Danes did. Liljencrantz proposed to make Gustavia a 
free port to attract foreign merchants to settle there. Furthermore, religious freedom 
48 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 210.
49 Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S.t Barthélemy, pp. 21–39.
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should be guaranteed.50 Liljencrantz’s recommendations were almost immediately 
put into effect: Gustavia was made a free port in 178551, and St. Barthélemy’s trade 
regulations were revised in October 1786, according to Liljencrantz’s advice.52 The 
proclamation of favourable business conditions was translated into French and 
English and circulated all around the West Indies. 
Although the regulation of Swedish trade with the West Indies included a charter 
for the Swedish West India Company including lower duties in direct trade between 
the island and Sweden, the company had no monopoly and also never became an 
important actor in St. Barthélemy’s trade.53
Liljencrantz’s strategy worked as intended. As a free port St Barthélemy attracted 
a large number of settlers from other islands. In the second half of the 1780s it 
became an important entrepôt in the trade between the American Republic and the 
British West Indies and the numbers of ships annually entering Gustavia increased 
to about a thousand.54 The population of the island increased from 750 in 1780, 
to 1,600 in 1787. The period of French Revolutionary Wars caused another boom 
both in population and number of ships entering Gustavia. In 1796 the island had 
about 3,000 inhabitants. A standard strategy of neutrality exploitation was to issue 
Swedish passports to foreign vessels, an opportunity which especially American 
ship owners used.55 
At the same time, much as Liljencrantz had predicted, these developments had 
very little to do with Swedish commercial state building. The commodity exchange 
between St. Barthélemy and Sweden was limited. No trade duties were levied 
because trade was free and no colonial goods were produced because the island 
was small and barren. St. Barthélemy’s trade was simply transit trade under Swedish 
flag. With an eye on a more comprehensive future commercial development direct 
links between Sweden and the United States were considered more promising.56 
The second part of post-1783 policy of neutral trade was Sweden’s ac-
knowledgement of and the trade treaty with the United States. Independence of 
British American colonies meant that a large previously protected imperial market 
would be opened for trade with Sweden. Since the 1770s, Swedes discussed the 
potential of trade with an independent America. Between 1782 and 1784 a Swedish 
traveller, Samuel G. Hermelin, addressed reports to the Swedish authorities about 
the market conditions and political development in North America. Liljencrantz 
himself also devised plans to channel America’s European exports via Swedish 
50 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 242.
51 Modée, Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7 dec. 1718, vol. 13, p. 227.
52 Modée, Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7 dec. 1718, vol. 13, p. 447.
53 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 245.
54 Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S.t Barthélemy, p. 163.
55 Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S.t Barthélemy, p. 289.
56 Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, pp. 199–222.
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ports, notably Marstrand. Unsurprisingly, these interests motivated a desire to 
acknowledge American Independence and conclude an advantageous commercial 
treaty. In March 1782, the Swedish envoy in Paris, Gustaf Philip Creutz, was 
instructed to contact Benjamin Franklin on this issue. By October the text of the trade 
treaty between the two states was ready. Here again Liljencranz was involved. The 
text followed closely the treaties between the United States and France and the 
United Provinces. A large part of the treaty concerned the conditions of shipping 
and trade under wartime conditions. The text included the principles expressed in 
the convention of the League of Armed Neutrality and both signatories expressed 
a desire for the general acceptance of the principles of neutral free trade.57 
Meanwhile, the Swedish envoy in Paris was instructed to extend the negotiation 
about treaty details while the war continued to avoid a conflict with Britain. The 
official date of signature was April 3 1783, which made Sweden the first non-
belligerent country to sign a trade treaty with the United States.58 However, 
expectations were higher than was justified. It took another two decades before the 
direct trade between Sweden and the United States took off, and then too it was an 
integral part of American commodity exchange with Europe during the Continental 
blockade.59
The West Indian colonial ambition was closely related to Swedish plans for 
slave trade. Swedish merchants participated in slave trade in the 1770s and 1780s, 
as neutral carriers for belligerents, but only to a limited extent. In 1776 the political 
writer Ulric Nordenskiöld advocated a slave trade under Swedish flag,60 yet only 
after the acquisition of St. Barthélemy did this plan come to fruition. The Swedish 
West India Company, which owned a privilege in the slave trade, considered a 
slave trading station in Africa. On Gustav III’s initiative three Swedes were sent to 
Africa to investigate a possibility of Swedish slave trade. In 1787 Anders Sparrman, 
Carl Bernhard Wadström and Carl Axel Arrhenius travelled on board of a French 
ship to Africa and spent some time in Senegal. However, the sight of the terrible 
living conditions of slaves did not trigger further Swedish trade initiatives, but turned 
Sparrman and Wadström into abolitionists.61 
Thus, Swedish colonial experiments came to an end owing to a variety of mainly 
political reasons that blocked relatively weak states like Sweden from turning foreign 
trade into a principle of commercial state building. This last mechanism indeed 
played a key role in the entire story of the development of Swedish economic politics 
57 Essén, Johan Liljencrantz, p. 194.
58 Modée, Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7 dec. 1718, vol. 12, p. 560.
59 Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 168.
60 Ulric Nordenskiöld, Afhandling om nyttan för Sverige af handel och nybyggen i Indierna och på 
Africa. (Stockholm, 1776).
61 Carl Bernhard Wadström, Observations on the slave trade, and a description of some part 
of the coast of Guinea, during a voyage, made in 1787, and 1788 (London, 1789). On Wadström 
see Philip K. Nelson, Carl Bernhard Wadström. Mannen bakom myterna (Norrköping: Föreningen 
Gamla Norrköping, 1998). 
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during the reign of Gustav III, which hitherto has been relatively neglected as a 
case of neutral trade politics, compared with the Dutch and Danish contexts. What 
this chapter has brought out from the point of view of economic history is that failed 
efforts and experiments in Swedish trade development were neither the result of 
bad policy, nor of straightforward political interests of other states blocking Swedish 
trade. Rather, it appears to have been the case that Sweden’s limited successes 
emanated from a complex of combined logics that consistently set restrictions to 
the extension of Swedish trade. The Danes, the Dutch and Catherine’s League 
of Armed Neutrality all managed to enforce their status of neutrals onto interstate 
commercial power relations and routinely circumvent its hazards from within the 
system, as it were. In contrast, when Sweden, which was relatively isolated in 
international politics and the Balance of Power, was successful in putting its foreign 
trade on the map, this was either due to short-lived opportunities to profit from its 
neutral status in wartime (see the example of the China tea trade above), or a well-
understood evasion of interstate commercial power relations (Liljencrantz choice 
to set up an entrepôt trade at St. Barthélemy instead of trying to make it a basis for 
commercial empire is a case in point). Independence may have been the political 
ideal that guided Liljencrantz’s foreign policy and trade designs during the reign 
of Gustav III, yet the Swedish predicament was that isolation – the lack of allies 
and of commercial interdependencies – often simply stood in the way of exploiting 
neutrality to that end.
